Resolutions Rotterdam 2022


Resolutions Rotterdam 2022 | Uncategorized


Hide-and-seek along Europe’s borders: As migrants keep fleeing inhumane situations to seek refuge in the EU, borders crossing increased by 70% in 2021. In light of the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, how can the EU provide better migration policies by effective solidarity and deepening international partnerships while keeping in mind the concerns of its Member States?

Submitted by: Pleun van Eijk (NL), Ensar Esen (NL), Benthe Jade Hauzendorfer (NL), Elodie Kho (NL), Parmis Mohajeri (NL), Chloé Post (NL), Sara Swaneen (NL), Luying Wang (NL), Fenna Winter (NL), Micaela Lai (Chairperson, IT)

The European Youth Parliament,

  1. Concerned by the lack of cooperation and trust between Member States regarding migration, resulting in unequally shared responsibilities and difficulties in forming an EU-wide, sustainable migration management system,
  2. Observing the lack of coordination, monitoring and evaluation of migration and coherent integration in all Member States,
  3. Recognising the physiological detriments resulting from civil unrest, violent situations, abuse and strained living conditions associated with seeking refuge,
  4. Regretting the lack of safe routes for refugees, who are forced to undergo irregular and dangerous journeys including long-distance walks and a severe risk of human trafficking,
  5. Concerned with the lack of resources in refugee camps and asylum centres across Member States, including:
    1. lack of funding to establish new centres in times of increasing need,
    2. existing facilities having to host up to 6-7 times the number of refugees they were designed for, 
  6. Deeply disturbed by the blatant violations of basic human rights known to have taken place in refugee camps,
  7. Noting with concern that refugee border crossings within the EU have increased by 70% in 2020 compared with 2019,
  8. Further noting with concern the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and safety of refugees as well as the decreased capacity for asylum application approvals,
  9. Noting with deep concern that some Member States, such as Hungary, are not respecting the EU’s rules, policies and values on asylum and migration,
  10. Bearing in mind the slow and complex asylum application procedures common to the EU, refugees can not legally enter a European country on short notice and may resort to unlawful entry instead,
  11. Considering the recent nonconformity of Turkey with regard to a 2016 refugee deal, 1The EU-Turkey joint action plan reflects the common understanding between the EU and Turkey and establishes an approach to the influx of specifically Syrian refugees entering the EU from turkey in a joint venture. whose aim was to create cooperation with Greece by splitting  leading to the redirection of a large group of asylum seekers to Greece;
  1. Appeals to all Member States to jointly work towards efficient long-term migration policies in cooperation with the countries of origin of the refugees;
  2. Asks the European Commission to incite a better common understanding of the current situation in refugee camps and at borders through the use of information campaigns wherein refugees may share their past experiences;
  3. Calls upon the European Commission to provide funding for integration support programmes in refugee camps with the aid of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs involved in similar activities;
  4. Requests the United Nations Refugee Agency to establish guidelines on the protection of the physical and psychological health through regular visits and hygiene rules;
  5. Suggests creating a solidarity mechanism based on an annual assessment of the amount of political and monetary contributions and aid offered by each Member State;  
  6. Requests the European Commission to amend the EU Recovery Plan to incorporate guidelines on healthcare and education services in refugee camps;
  7. Authorises the European Commission to fund the training of volunteers for the asylum application process in overcrowded refugee camps;
  8. Urges the European External Action Service to remind Turkey to more strictly adhere to the 2016 refugee deal using diplomatic action;
  9. Recommends the European Commission to involve European Humanitarian Admission Programmes in migration infrastructure to safely and efficiently relocate refugees between Member States. 


Resolutions Rotterdam 2022 | Uncategorized


Flying under the radar: The use of armed drones for targeted killings, especially outside formal war zones, remains contentious while the EU has an opportunity to play an important role in setting international standards on the use of armed drones. How can the EU address the ongoing concerns over armed drones, particularly regarding the lack of transparency, accountability and potential human rights violations?

Submitted by: David Cvetkovski (NL), Janou Gregorowitsch (NL), Gabrielle Groeneveld (NL), Anna Jansen op de Haar (NL), Jason der Kinderen (NL), Lieveke Schoordijk (NL), Marieke de Weerd (NL), Sinéad de Visser (NL), Hana Vicherková (Chairperson, CZ)

The European Youth Parliament,

  1. Fully aware of the inevitable continuous utilisation of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) such as the Future Combat Air System 1  The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is a core initiative of the Macron Administration for both defence modernization and building out defence cooperation with its core Airbus allies, Germany and Spain. in the future of warfare,
  2. Deeply concerned by the lack of concrete legislation resulting in the appearance of loopholes, creating the possibility of accountability avoidance regarding the use of UCAVs,
  3. Alarmed by the changed psychological phenomena as a result of the utilisation of UCAVs such as the dehumanisation of military operations,
  4. Acknowledging the number of military personnel deployed in active combat zones harmed by the negative effects of war often resulting in mental health issues, physical injuries or even death,
  5. Deeply regretting the lack of a common stance of the Member States pertaining to the use of UCAVs for targeted killings during warfare,
  6. Recognising the hazards specific to the use of UCAV technology, such as technical malfunction or miscalculation of projectile trajectories,
  7. Emphasising the importance of the fundamental values of the European Union as mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2 Article 2 of TEU states the values of the EU such as the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights.
  8. Observing the lack of accountability Member States currently have for actions in warfare, illustrated by instances such as:
    1. the past condemnation by the EU of targeted UCAV attacks in Israel,
    2. conscious killing of civilians as a result of military strategies that allow such an occurrence as a compromise,
  9. Noting with regret the lack of transparency in relation to:
    1. registration and licensing of unmanned aerial vehicles capable of carrying payloads,
    2. the estimated amount of civilian deaths caused by UCAVs,
    3. the GPS coordinates of UCAVs moving outside of combat zones;
  1. Calls upon the European Commission to create a structured framework on weaponry used in combat with a particular focus on UCAVs so as to prevent loopholes found in previous signed treaties;
  2. Advises the European Commision to allocate funding towards non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing humanitarian aid for civilian victims residing in areas affected by the use of UCAVs;
  3. Appeals to Member States’ Ministries of Defence to introduce an extensive military training programme for UCAV operators consisting of:
    1. additional psychological testing ensuring the mental capabilities of personnel,
    2. an explanatory course deeply focusing on the moral consequences of the usage of UCAVs in warfare;
  4. Encourages Member States to recognise the positive aspects of UCAV usage such as the reduced need for troops in active combat;
  5. Supports discussions between Member States in order to work towards a unified strategy of UCAV implementation;
  6. Suggests the European Commission to allocate funding to departments responsible for  regular technical inspections of UCAVs focusing on defect prevention stemming from:
    1. inconsistent application of new technologies across models and makes,
    2. software or hardware malfunctions;
  7. Calls upon the European Council to strictly sanction the failure to adhere to the general EU ideal to retain democratic values, human rights and rule of law as mentioned in Article 2 of TEU regardless of the type of combat means implemented during warfare;
  8. Invites peace-keeping NGOs to conduct independent impartial investigations with the intention of:
    1. preventing vagueness regarding the engagement of UCAVs during military operations,
    2. analysing the justification of collateral damage in the form of civilian casualties for  separate instances;
  9. Calls upon the European Commission to devise a legislative proposal to encourage transparency pertaining to the use of UCAVs by:
    1. making the reporting of the list of newly purchased and already possessed armed drones similar to the existing public nuclear weaponry list as well as the number of civilian casualties during targeted killings,
    2. demanding clear information from Member States on the movement of UCAVs passing through airspaces of Member States in a confidential manner with the affected Member States’ governments.


Resolutions Rotterdam 2022 | Uncategorized


European security shrewdness: As worldwide economic, geopolitical and military competition increases and new security alliances are taking shape, Member States are increasingly isolated, but their military spending continues to break records. Given the reluctance of some Member States to establish a common defence union, how can the EU adapt its security policy to these unprecedented geopolitical developments?

Submitted by: Ischa van Bemmel (NL), Felix Crawford (NL), Boet Heijmerink (NL), Daantje van Hout (NL), Willem Knibbe (NL), Nicole Lahmer (CH), Hélène Mulder (NL), Marcus van Strier (NL), Ivor Meštrović (Chairperson, HR)

The European Youth Parliament

  1. Points out the fact that Member States have conflicting approaches and interests which makes it difficult to reach necessary political consensus on the EU’s security and defence policies, resulting in:
    1. imperfect cooperation between Member States regarding their security and defence, especially in terms of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)1 The Permanent Structured Cooperation is a coordinating body within the EU with which Member States freely join to further strengthen their security and defence policy through various projects, trainings,  researches,  initiatives, and similar activities. , and European Union Military Staff (EUMS),
    2. frictions and inefficiencies in cooperation between Member States’ defence and security structures and the EU agencies responsible for security and defence, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA)2 The European Defence Agency is  an intergovernmental agency of the Council of the European Union. Its mission is to support Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the security and defence policies., and the European External Action Service (EEAS),
    3. deficient development and insufficient execution of such policies, especially in terms of cooperation and coordination,
  2. Deeply concerned with the lacking cooperation and ineffective communication between the European Union agencies and Member State counterparts on common security and defence policies,
  3. Realises a lack of a common approach to the protection of EU external borders while welcoming the supportive work of Frontex3 Frontex is an EU agency designated to support Member States’ border security forces on the external borders of the EU. on the matter,
  4. Welcomes the harmonising, peace-seeking and security-enhancing work done through PESCO, EDA, and several projects financed by the European Defence Fund (EDF),
  5. Recognises the EU’s dependence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for its security and defence following the Berlin Plus Agreement4 The Berlin Plus Agreement is a comprehensive set of agreements made between NATO and the EU to strengthen the Union’s security and defence, specifically against external threats.,
  6. Fully aware of the impact of recently formed alliances (e.g. AUKUS), rising geo-political tensions (e.g. Russia-Ukraine), as well as assertive foreign policy approaches of other States such as the People’s Republic of China on the European continent, notes:
    1. increasing public demand for a common defence union,
    2. polarisation of public and political opinion in Member States, in relation to both domestic and foreign policy,
    3. varying levels of Member States’ dependence on non-EU states on matters critical to national security and defence, predominantly energy and infrastructure,
    4. further enhancement of Member State cooperation through joint bilateral pacts and purchases of military equipment,
  7. Alarmed by the lack of a long-term EU security and defence strategy,
  8. Acknowledges the importance of civilian aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
  9. Aware of the lack of protection from ever-expanding hybrid threats, leading to an unsafe digital environment for EU citizens,
  10. Regrets excessive military expenditure across Member States due to:
    1. decentralised military production and conduct of research,
    2. lacking Member State and EU institutional cooperation,
  11. Considers EU citizens’ distress that the incumbent EU security and defence policy is insufficient for keeping up with other global powers and challenges, and in turn requires increased development,
  12. Acknowledges the increased calls for a common defence union,
  13. Takes into consideration the possibility of Member States not joining the common defence union due to their specific values, interests, and political leanings,
  14. Understands that Member States grouping together on defence could be considered as a geopolitical provocation outside of the EU;
  1. Urges the EDA and Member States to give preference to trade with other Member States and their allies regarding defence critical goods5 Defence critical goods are all items and objects considered to be of essential importance for the national security of a particular State. over States which do not align with the set of common EU values;
  2. Calls upon the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats to cooperate with the EDA to better prepare and protect against external cyber threats across the entire EU, by:
    1. further providing trainings and exercises for hybrid threats,
    2. further providing and participating in research and analysis on hybrid and cyber threats,
    3. coordinating and considering different needs and liabilities of Member States,
    4. advising Member States’ governments, as well as the EDA on potential threats,
    5. bringing together different stakeholders when it comes to hybrid threats;
  3. Disapproves of the individualised security alliances between Member States which weaken the CSDP;
  4. Appeals to Member States’ intelligence agencies to stimulate cooperation on a more substantial and common basis by setting up frequent meetings to discuss shared interests and goals;
  5. Suggests the European Council to make the defence and security policies of the EU less dependent on NATO;
  6. Emphasises and strongly encourages the importance of civilian aspects of the CSDP in education, mediation, aiding border security agencies, and diplomacy;
  7. Requests the SEDE Committee of the European Parliament to promote transparency through a variety of social platforms, for example, newspapers and TV shows;
  8. Directs the European Council and EEAS to centre the EU’s approach to security and defence around conflict de-escalation and peacekeeping to maintain the EU’s neutral position in the world;
  9. Appeals to PESCO to restructure their policies and projects regarding EU security and defence so that their guidelines are more in line with those of the CSDP, thus stimulating the two to work together more closely and in turn better aid Member States and the EU’s defence and security goals;
  10. Welcomes the common approach to the protection of EU external borders done by Frontex;
  11. Requests the European Commission to propose a restructuring of the EDA into an executive agency with its direction being decided by Member States’ heads of government and defence and security ministries, with:
    1. the leadership consisting of chosen 27 Member States’ government’s representatives,
    2. monthly meetings with all relevant members from all Member States,
    3. establishing far-reaching common values and principles in terms of security and defence in the form an explicit declaration of the Union itself and its 27 Member States,
    4. harmonising Member States’ stances on external threats,
    5. drafting, discussing, creating, and publishing medium- and long-term security and defence priorities and strategies of the EU,
    6. further integrating armed forces of Member States while allowing them to opt out of such shared EU forces, should they consider it to be onerous,
  12. Urges the EDF to structure opportunities for unified EU-wide military equipment purchases in order to:
    1. encourage the signing of only short- and medium-term contracts to create healthy market competition in the defence sector, 
    2.  increase overall product quality;
  13. Calls upon the EDA to enhance communication between the security and defence institutions in regard to situational developments, with the main goal being to be able to compete with the other global powers.


Resolutions Rotterdam 2022 | Uncategorized


Turning waste into opportunity: The EU is adopting measures to accelerate the transition to a circular economy whilst each EU citizen produces nearly half a tonne of municipal waste in a single year. In light of the Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) of the European Commission, how should the EU further support Member States in their transition to a circular economy? 

Submitted by: Miriam Dragosits (CH), Roemer Declercq (NL), Lusan Haan (NL), Nailah Zafira Hofstetter (NL), Dewran Murad (NL), Mika Christina Schukken (NL), Evanti ten Voorde (NL), Daryna Hoch (Chairperson, UA)

The European Youth Parliament,

  1. Noting with dissatisfaction that certain Member States are not adhering to current waste management legislation, such as the Waste Framework Directive1The Waste Framework Directive establishes the principles of waste management and waste hierarchy. and the Landfill Directive2The Landfill Directive introduces basic requirements of landfilling and waste treatment.,
  2. Pointing out that particular Member States are financially incapable of transitioning to a circular economy,
  3. Expressing appreciation toward the Member States for developing National Action Plans harmonised with the the Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP), 
  4. Concerned with the lack of sufficient governmental incentives for businesses to adopt circular economy business model,
  5. Disturbed by the fact that NGOs do not have any influence over the decision-making process on a governmental level,
  6. Deeply concerned by the recent rise of mass consumption and mass production trends,
  7. Alarmed by consumers’ lack of awareness on circular economy, its benefits and ways of implementing it,
  8. Deploring businesses implementing greenwashing3Greenwashing is a form of marketing spin in which green PR and green marketing are deceptively used to persuade the public that an organisation’s products, aims and policies are environmentally friendly. practises,
  9. Expressing regret about the lack of sufficient EU funding for the practical implementation of circular economy initiatives by the general public, 
  10. Regretting the lack of investments, possible consumer loss due to higher prices, and lack of governmental support and general knowledge on circular economy for businesses,
  11. Further acknowledging the reluctance of businesses towards changing into circular economy business,
  12. Recognising the difficulties the EU faces when trading with non-EU based companies which do not adhere to the EU standards for the production;
  1. Calls upon the European Commision to establish a new annual Intergovernmental Conference on Circular Economy (ICCE), which will:
    1. be a focal point for tracking the progress and sharing short-term plans of Member States on their transition to circular economy,
    2. serve as a knowledge-sharing platform on legislation and practical implementations of circular economy;
  2. Requests the European Environment Agency (EEA) to create a specific Circular Economy Task Force (CETF), consisting of interdisciplinary experts and NGO representatives, which will: 
    1. analyse Member States’ reports on their short-term progress in transitioning into circular economy models,
    2. identify the source of the problems for Member States not adhering to the the circular economy legislation,
    3. visit specific Member States to consult with local environmental NGOs and governmental structures;
  3. Calls upon the European Investment Bank to reallocate existing funds to the Member States in need based on the consultations with the CETF;
  4. Further calls upon the Member States to use the reallocated funds as an incentive for local businesses transitioning to circular economy business models;
  5. Urges national governments to raise direct taxes if the companies are using non-recyclable materials for the production, selling non-recyclable products, or using unsustainable transportation;
  6. Instructs the European Commission to increase the authority of NGOs specialising in circular economy by:
    1. inviting NGOs to the ICCE,
    2. giving the consulting position in the EU governmental bodies;
  7. Encourages the European Commission to further support and prolong the LIFE program4The LIFE Programme is the EU’s funding instrument for the environment and climate action. to 2050, specifically in the sphere of circular economy;
  8. Encourages the EEA to provide experts in the field of circular economy upon Member States requests; 
  9.  Encourages the Member States to provide public education on circular economy to the general public through:
    1. governmental advertisements, 
    2. public debates, 
    3. courses for all levels educational levels;
  10. Calls upon the European Commission to improve on the current CEAP greenwashing regulations by:
    1. making the ecolabelling system5Ecolabeling system is a voluntary system that identifies products that have a reduced environmental impact throughout their lifecycle. obligatory,
    2. setting up a publicly available database rating companies and their products on a sustainability scale using the Product Environmental Footprint Methodology6Product Environmental Footprint Methodology is a methodology created to provide a common way of measuring environmental performance for companies within the EU wishing to market their product.;
  11. Instructs the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) to introduce a quota on the European internal market, limiting the amount of products from manufacturers that do not adhere to the standard of sustainability scale,
  12. ​​Recommends the European Commission to revise the “Monitoring progress towards a circular economy” section of the CEAP by taking The Science for Environment Policy7The Science for Environment Policy study has analysed how to reduce the environmental footprint of EU trade by preferentially importing goods from countries that have greener production processes. into account.