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Committee on Security and Defence

European security shrewdness: As worldwide economic, geopolitical and military competition increases and new security alliances are taking shape, Member States are increasingly isolated, but their military spending continues to break records. Given the reluctance of some Member States to establish a common defence union, how can the EU adapt its security policy to these unprecedented geopolitical developments?

Ivor Meštrović (Chairperson, HR)

Introduction 

The European Union has gone through a tumultuous pair of decades. The Covid-19 crisis has further changed the perception many countries have of their overall strengths and weaknesses, including their defence industries and systems. From the rise of aggressive Chinese foreign policy to the latest AUKUS Agreement, the EU’s foreign affairs and security sector have been more and more fragmented, both industrially and politically, and, in turn, more isolated, yet the EU is becoming an increasingly relevant global player. Member States have never reached profound common agreement on joint European defence and security undertakings. This is at odds with what the majority of European citizens seek on an European level because the citizens want the EU to do more in terms of its foreign and security policy, as is shown on the map.

Main Actors

The European Council

The European Council creates the general direction of the EU. Meetings of this Council are attended by respective heads of state or government. During the meetings they are tasked with creating not just the general direction of the Union, but also the necessary consensus for it. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the European Council to set the agenda clearly, especially when it comes to topics of high stakes and interest (such as this one).

National governments, the Council of the EU

Member States work mainly through the Council of the EU. The Defence configuration of the Foreign Affairs Council is particularly relevant because it consists of all Member States Defence Ministers, ensuring each and every one has a say in the decision-making process. Moreover, although security is under the jurisdiction of Member States, the EU plays a special role. Simply put, the EU may act according to its own view, but ultimately it cannot go against the wishes of Member States.

The European Commission, High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy

The European Commission is the sole legislative initiator and principal and overreaching executive institution of the Union — from execution of the laws to coordination of Member State cooperation. Specifically, one of the Commissioners — the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy — is a key player here as he heads the European External Action Service, diplomatic service which also deals with security policy, Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex; executive force which protects the external borders of the Union), as well as the European Defence Agency (EDA). EDA brings together all Member States defence proceedings and structures. This is a relatively new agency for the EU, however its relevance has been rising for years. Another very relevant actor is the European Union Military Staff  (EUMS) which provides early warnings, situation assessments, strategic planning, concept development, training, education, and support of military partnerships.

By Sofia Kasapidou (Media Team Member)

Past: Actions Taken

• The Union has its own policy on defence and security —the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) — which is mainly centred around helping Member States meet their needs and wishes. It built upon the previous EU security and foreign affairs policies, created the European External Action Service, and set foundations for further European defence and security policy. One of the key documents is the Civilian CSDP Compact which encompasses political commitments regarding joint European security and defence policy. Military Planning and Conduct Capability is the central body for military strategery of the policy. It extensively cooperates with the Directorate-General of EUMS and EDA to support and improve European defence capabilities and further develop CSDP.
• Berlin Plus Arrangement between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union further shaped the defence and security policy by providing NATO facilities to the EU and, de facto, made it a principal pillar of the EU defence. NATO-EU cooperation was further developed in 2016 with a joint declaration and another one in 2018.
• The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was initiated in 2017. It is a program in which 25 of the 27 (Malta and Denmark opted out) national armed forces pursue structural integration. This Cooperation is a very active instrument, as its latest factsheet reveals, however it is mainly centred around short-term to medium-term projects.
• Coordinated Annual View on Defence, implemented in 2017, is tasked with providing Member States with the analysis of the current defence situation and identify potential areas of cooperation.
• The European Defence Fund (EDF) was also established in 2017 and was allocated a significant budget throughout the years for “more efficient spending in joint defence capabilities, strengthening European citizens’ security and fostering a competitive and innovative industrial base”. The infographic provides more information about its expenses.

Present: Existing Issues

The general direction

European defence and security has always been a thought-provoking subject. Since the 1950s it has been discussed in one way or another, especially when it came to the European Defence Union. Through time, the EU moved towards developing a joint defence. Many of these ideas greatly varied in their vision and scope. Same can be said for incumbent proposals. However, all of them required either concrete action on the matter or the complete abandonment of the concept of common European defence and security cooperation.

Strategy, institutions, and coordination

The main issue of any defence and security policy is the strategy. At the moment, the EU has its own goals, but lacks a thorough and long-term strategy that includes every Member State. Additionally, there are several coordination issues, namely in cooperation between armed forces, as well as intelligence communities. When coordination exists, it is very limited, especially in intelligence as many Member States are still wary of another State possessing confidential information unless absolutely necessary. Another strain on further development is the fact that there is no institutional embedding. What is more, the lack of substantial solutions and cooperation has resulted in certain Member States creating pacts of their own, such as the Franco-Greek defence pact, Aachen Treaty, and the Qurinal Treaty.

Fragmented defence industry

Current EU law allows for a strong fragmentation of the Member State defence industries, as this is perceived to be of vital national importance. This means that there is a significant amount of diverging interests, and different regulation in the Union. In order to innovate, many seek to speed up the EU’s soft and slow coordination and overturn its weak position to legislate which further amplifies the problem. This is relevant in the fields of military research and development, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, as well as the defence industry in general which is usually one of the most heavily-regulated industries due to its existential importance. Consequently, the fragmentation derogates European defence in many ways, as the EU Parliament has noticed.

Question of Borders

Frontex has gained more relevance in the last few years as it became a significant EU external border protection force. It usually cooperates more with police forces than armed forces. However, the questions surrounding border security are one of the highest European priorities and rightfully so, as the EU has been seeing immense pressures on its external border.

Future: Challenges Ahead

What now

If the Union seeks to progress towards a European Defence Union  and ensure coherence and consistency in the Commission’s work linked to defence, the main question is how to actually do it while bringing everyone together. This vague common vision in the Strategic Compass as of late 2021 provides the necessary foundation for further development, but it is unclear what kind of cooperation, structure, and Member State partnership the Union seeks to achieve. This is also seen in the opinions and perceptions of the citizens’, as they seek more, but it is not clear what exactly that more is. Therefore, the fundamental problem remains how to do substantially better while ensuring Member State consensus.

What should be the EU’s role?

Another question poses if the EU is to do more — what kind of role should it play geopolitically? Should it continue to be a big advocate for intervention only as a peace-keeping force in cooperation with the UN, whether diplomatically or militarily, or should it reconsider its approach to suit either extreme (heavy interventionism or complete isolationism).

European Defence Union of Issues

The lack of a common vision and plan of action further amplify the underlying problems as they are merely talked about, not acted upon. The aforementioned issues are not solved, yet other questions line up, such as the EU’s cooperation with third countries, not just in its neighbourhood, but also on other continents. This cooperation is anything but clear. Most importantly, the Union lacks central coordination as there are many different instruments which are not integrated efficiently.

NATO

Although the EU already has some form of cooperation with NATO, it is unclear if the current state of cooperation is viewed positively by all involved. Possibilities range from almost full integration to leading a completely independent policy from it. This is further linked to the quarrels regarding European strategic autonomy.

Strategic autonomy?

Strategic autonomy is the ability of a country to pursue its own defence and foreign affairs interests in the way it deems necessary. The calls for  European strategic autonomy have been amplified by several European heads of states and governments, as well as active discussions of non-European NATO members on the matter in the past few years. Alliance and cooperation with NATO have been questioned as well. However, this is a much contested idea that is supported and opposed based on many various motivations.

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)

5G or not to be: While the advent of 5G technology promises to change our reality drastically, the EU lags behind great powers such as China and the US. Considering the pervasive conspiracy theories and the Member States’ differing 5G deployment plans, how should the EU develop a 5G strategy that addresses public concerns while keeping up with the rest of the world in technological developments?

Gent Gjylbegu (Chairperson, FI) & Lars van der Ent (Chairperson, NL)

Introduction 

The fifth generation (5G) technology, developed to significantly boost the responsiveness of wireless networks, promises data transmission at speeds as high as 20 gigabits per second. The implementation of this new technology will accommodate the increasing reliance on mobile and internet-based devices, the development of Internet of Things (IoT) and machine-to-machine (M2M) communication.

Even though the European Commission initiated research on 5G in 2013 through various programmes, such as 5G-PPP, the EU is lagging behind great powers such as China and the US. As of yet, only 39% of the 5G spectrum is available for usage. A unified 5G implementation scheme for all Member States is lacking and the differences between them are visible. 

While the European Commission has published its connectivity targets, the rollout of 5G has met numerous public concerns and fierce resistance from protestors. The deployment of 5G remains difficult, since 5G requires a more extensive network of antennas and other transmitting devices. Due to limited coverage, cell antennas will have to be installed in close proximity with each other, which in turn raises anxieties about public health. In addition, during the pandemic, conspiracy theories have emerged about a potential connection between 5G technology and COVID-19.

Main Actors

The European Commission is the executive branch of the EU, responsible for proposing legislation, implementing decisions and upholding EU treaties. 5G is an essential part of the European Commission’s policy on Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market. In the area of electronic communications network infrastructure and the single market, the European Commission and Member States have shared competences, meaning they can both propose legislation and take action in these areas. Responsibility for rollout execution lies with Member States.

The European Commission financially supports the 5G Observatory, responsible for monitoring network infrastructure and 5G technology developments. Moreover, the European Commission collaborates with the European information and communications technology (ICT) industry through the 5G public-private partnership (5G-PPP), established in 2013 to boost technological innovation and research concerning 5G.

Furthermore, a growing anti-5G movement has expressed fierce resistance against the rollout of 5G and has swayed public authorities to research health and environmental dangers of EMF, as well as cell phone radiation. 15 Member States warned the European Commission of the resistance, calling for an EU strategy to counter misinformation. In 2020, protestors conducted arson attacks on telecom masts. On social media, the movement has taken on the form of national Stop 5G groups, spreading conspiracy theories linking COVID-19 to the rollout of 5G. 

The European Environmental Agency (EEA) is tasked with providing the European Union and its cooperating states with environmentally related information, used for drafting sustainable policies. Upon requests by the European Commission, the Scientific Committee on Health, Environment and Emerging Risks (SCHEER) offers opinions relating to matters of health, environmental and emerging risks. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), linked to the World Health Organisation, is concerned with research developments relating to cancer. All these institutions have argued for precaution regarding the rollout of 5G. 

Past: Actions Taken

• In 2016, the European Commission presented the 5G Action Plan, which aims to start the deployment of networks by 2018 and initiate the launch of 5G services in all Member States by 2020. Presently, this action plan still requires implementation. 
• In 2020, the European Parliament looked into the health risks of 5G. It provided an overview of various opinions in the global and European scientific communities, noting some discrepancies among researchers and scientists regarding health hazards of EMF exposure.
• In response to conspiracy theories linking 5G to COVID-19, the World Health Organisation in 2020 put this misinformation at the top of its mythbusters list, hoping to tackle the spread of these conspiracy theories and non-scientifically backed public concerns. The European Commission has shared similar mythbusters on its website. 
• In March 2021, the European Commission published its connectivity targets for the European Union. For instance, it aims to ensure that by 2030, all EU households have gigabit connectivity and that 5G covers all urban areas. 
• In 2021, the European Commission collaborated with Member States on a Connectivity Toolbox, consisting of a collection of best practices, such as continued research and streamlining electronic network permit granting procedures. to accommodate the implementation of 5G. The Connectivity Toolbox also includes deadlines for Member States. By April 2021, Member States should have presented to the European Commission roadmaps for the implementation of the practises in the Toolbox and by April 2022, each Member State should report on the progress of the Toolbox implementation. 
• In July 2021, the European Parliament presented a report on the health impacts of 5G, proving its earlier expectations. The report also includes some policy proposals, such as promoting state of the art technology for mobile phones which decrease EMF health hazards, and defining new EMF exposure limits. 

Present: Existing Issues

Deployment difficulties

5G has proven difficult to install and deploy, requiring more transmitters than current technologies in use to cover all areas. The antennae needed to cover all areas have to be installed very close to each other, possibly causing damage in human health. Moreover, the ongoing pandemic has stopped manufacturers across Europe from continuing with 5G deployment due to social distancing requirements, indicating the need to explore automation technologies.

Another issue concerning 5G deployment is the lack of radio access network infrastructure. Regions such as North America and Asia have progressed much further regarding infrastructure, because of the presence of more Open RAN players. The EU only has 13 Open RAN players, compared to 57 in the world. Without a more developed radio access network, the EU struggles more significantly to deploy 5G. 

Public concerns

5G implementation comes with new and greater potential security threats. Approximately 32% of operators are concerned about a greater attack surface. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified these issues as the world population was forced to use internet-based devices for education and daily activities. Although vulnerability of 5G to cyberattacks is an issue that the EU has been aware of since 2019, no measures have been taken in response to this report.

Furthermore, environmental and health organisations have advocated  precaution regarding the rollout of 5G. Specifically regarding EMF, scientists have found harmful impacts on the environment and human health, including the development of cancer, memory loss, learning disabilities and genetic damage, as well as loss of biodiversity. Action has yet to be taken. 

In addition, anxieties regarding privacy have emerged. These anxieties have developed as the major companies providing 5G and its relay equipment originate in China. Recently, reports have surfaced showing that some of these companies may try to collect sensitive information, which generates major public concerns. Moreover, the Chinese government has access to data collected by Chinese companies. Many states renounce the idea that sensitive information falls in the hands of the Chinese government. This issue is also at the heart of geopolitical tensions between China and the United States. The EU is caught in the middle between these great powers. Being pressured by the United States to prohibit Chinese companies deploying 5G while hoping to achieve a positive partnership with China, the EU finds itself in an awkward position. While the EU has provided guidance regarding cybersecurity, Member States have taken on their own positions.

Anti-5G movement resistance

Finally, as signalled by 15 Member States, 5G rollout has met staggering resistance by the anti-5G movement. Beside ill-founded concerns about the health effects of cell phone radiation, conspiracy theories linking COVID-19 to 5G have emerged and spread on social media. These anxieties and conspiracy theories have culminated in protests and criminal attacks on telecom masts. Although both the WHO and the European Commission have attempted to counter false information, the concerns and conspiracy theories still exist. 

Future: Challenges Ahead

As the European Commission hopes to prepare the EU for the digital era, how should the EU continue the rollout of 5G? Considering, the EU lacks behind great powers such as China and the United States, the EU must race against the clock. However, the EU is hindered by a multitude of public concerns, such as health and environmental hazards, privacy concerns, security threats and conspiracy theories. 

Moreover, while Member States address Chinese 5G providers differently due to privacy concerns and security threats, the EU lacks a major provider to support 5G deployment. The EU struggles to fill the gaps and has not decided on a unified approach. Member States such as Sweden have completely banned Huawei, while Hungary remains optimistic about Chinese 5G providers. How should the EU navigate these geopolitical tensions and privacy concerns, considering the different positions of Member States?

Finally, a lack of understanding of 5G exacerbates the situation. Most citizens know about 5G, but do not fully understand its risks and benefits. This causes less positive attitudes to 5G and makes citizens vulnerable to conspiracy theories and misinformation. How should the EU address these concerns whilst accelerating the rollout of 5G?

Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Shaping Europe’s fit for the digital age: European Commission adopted its proposal for the Digital Markets Act, which aims to ensure fair and open digital markets. Considering that this proposal focuses on large online platforms acting as “gatekeepers”, what other steps should the EU take to drive competitiveness, increase choices for consumers and create a sustainable strategy for digital markets?

Esin Esendemir (Chairperson, NL)

Introduction 

Digital services are one of the most crucial elements of our everyday society; More than a quarter of the world population has purchased goods or services online in 2020. Whereas over 10,000 online platforms operate in Europe’s digital economy, only a small number of online platforms capture the largest share. These few large platforms have benefited from characteristics often embedded in their own platforms like the increasing network effects.

Member States have thus far failed to accurately implement measures against sexual trafficking. These large platforms act as gatekeepers between business users and end consumers, which leads to significant reliance of many business users on gatekeepers. This gradually leads to a lack of competitiveness which can be directly correlated to higher prices, lower quality, and less choice and innovation, harming European consumers. 

In recent years, the EU has proposed new rules regarding the transparency of the gatekeepers. However, there are several criticisms towards the European Commission’s latest proposal, the Digital Markets Act (DMA), like the inconsideration of company business models when identifying gatekeepers, and the inconsideration of the user or business’s ability to use multiple platforms for similar purposes. Regarding the future, there are developing concerns regarding whether the selected list of services is future proof, since with the changing dynamic of technology and the market these are bound to be outdated quickly.

Main Actors

Gatekeepers

A ‘gatekeeper’ is a company that meets the qualitative criterias of having a durable strong economic position in the market (with turnover of at least €6.5bn), linking large user bases with at least 45 million monthly active end users to 10,000 yearly active business users while having significant impact on the internal market, being active in at least 3 EU countries in the last three years. These company gatekeepers are unavoidable in the current European market and consumption system. The narrowly defined objective criteria aims to be more precise with tackling the internationally used platforms like Google and Facebook.

Member States

Member States have given overall support towards the Commission’s initial proposal but requested clarification on some regulations, like a public disclosure from core online platforms on how many staff are moderating content and the languages they speak. Member States have national competition authorities, however large scale actions towards gatekeepers tend to be taken through bodies of the EU.

Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, GROW

The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union which can propose legislation, enforce EU laws and direct the Union’s administrative operations. To ensure a future-proof DMA, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs will carry out market investigations to qualify new companies as gatekeepers and will dynamically update obligations for the gatekeepers when necessary. 

Business users (smaller companies)

Business users engaging with their customers via the bigger online platforms have almost no say in the business processes of the gatekeepers. These businesses are mostly privately owned corporations or partnerships that have fewer employees and less annual revenue than a corporation.

Consumers

The consumers are the ones making use of the services and products provided by the smaller companies and/through big online platforms. The DMA aims to aid consumers directly and have a clearer understanding of their choices, rights and freedoms as a consumer.

Past: Actions Taken

The EU has already taken several measures to aim for a future-proof operation, subjecting the online platforms to these prohibitions and obligations:

• In July 2019, the European Commission launched a series of antitrust investigations in recent years and reflected on how to adapt  tools under EU competition law to level the playing field in the digital environment.
• In July 2020, the EU Platform-to-Business Regulation went into force, establishing new rules for transparency and redress mechanisms for businesses using online platforms’ services. 
• In February 2020, European Commission policymakers considered a shift from result based antitrust intervention to forecast based regulation.

Along with this, the DMA aims to establish these regulations:

• The classification of ‘GAFAM’ (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft) as consistent gatekeepers, while some companies like Netflix and Spotify will be excluded because of the non-provision of Core Platform Services (CPS).
• Requiring a notification to the European Commision to assess mergers and acquisitions and ban gatekeepers from combining personal data from different sources.
• In line with this, the DMA requires gatekeepers to treat their own products on equal terms as other products sold, and are not allowed to prevent consumers from buying on other platforms or from uninstalling pre-installed software for competitive advantage.

However, it is important to remember that the DMA is still a legislative proposal which has not yet been implemented, and therefore cannot be officially counted as measures taken.

Present: Existing Issues

Multi-homing

One of the most common criticisms of the Commission’s proposal is that there is a lack of clarity on the scope of the DMA in the overall framework of EU regulation on digital services which could lead to inconsistencies or misinterpretations. Another current issue is that the DMA does not take the user or business’s ability to use multiple platforms for the same purpose into account. A clear example of this are flight tickets: the user can look for prices and book a flight on various available platforms, or directly on the website of the travel agency. The airline can offer its tickets via the same channels. This is called multi-homing. If customers can multi-home, they are more likely to escape conditions imposed by one platform by increasing the use of a competing platform. The ability to multi-home has also been proposed as a gatekeeper criterion, keeping in mind the extent of multi-homing by users on each side of the market. For instance, the low switching costs of e-commerce  allow for a great degree of multi-homing. If users can multi-home, the number of users may not exactly reflect the absence of competition. There isn’t any substantive clarification on actual gatekeeping power in the current proposal as the proposed criterias are mostly focused on size of gatekeepers.

Consideration of differing business models

In addition, the DMA treats competing services that differ solely on their business models (advertising-financed versus subscription-based, like Youtube and Netflix, respectively) differently, even though there is empirical evidence that these video-sharing platform services compete with each other. This leads to discriminatory treatment based on the choice of the business models (important to note here is te alleged market power does not play a role in the said discriminatory treatment).

Categorising a gatekeeper

To avoid falling into a ‘gatekeeper company’ category, large firms could have an incentive to break down their platforms into smaller, more specific services, which alone would not meet the quantitative criteria for designation, creating a loophole in the system. The gatekeeping power of several large companies is hard to disentangle due to their multinational nature. Targeting specific platforms can cause unfair attribution to a few of these platforms. However, the DMA does not mention anything about the ability to orchestrate an ecosystem for the definition of a gatekeeper. This is another issue that makes it difficult to disentangle the said gatekeeping power. As of now, the DMA is being reviewed by the European Parliament,slowly making its way towards finalisation. It is expected that the EU regulation could take effect in 2022 with the proper adjustments. As mentioned, there are several concerns on the effectiveness and future-proof adaptability of the regulation which ought to be clarified during the finalisation

Future: Challenges Ahead

Given the dynamic nature of the platform market, which is constantly transforming, a regulation defining a specific list of services might lack future-proof adaptability, meaning that the selected list of services might become outdated very quickly. Moreover, there isn’t a clear definition of CPS’s used by gatekeepers, function wise. This leaves question marks on the definition of a gatekeeper by itself: Can companies avoid being classified gatekeepers? Besides that, the fact that all business users within the system along with the core providers from the platform will be equalised means that the users will now be exposed to more choices: Will the DMA lead to consumer fatigue because of multi-homing strategies used by consumers and business users? This issue still has not been resolved and keeps all parties wondering whether this could potentially create a cycle of excessive and minimal usage of marketing techniques, more so adding to the concerns.

Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

The silk road of inhumane transport: Although 72% of human trafficking victims in the EU were women and 60% suffered from sexual exploitation, the new EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings falls short of specific measures to protect women. Considering the variability of measures by Member States, what steps should the EU take to prevent women from trafficking for sexual exploitation?

Raphael Gross-Chartuni (Chairperson, NL), Nina Tsoutsanis (Chairperson, NL)

Introduction 

“Trafficking is a crime of men against women”. The Commissioner on Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, said this in regards to the publication of the new EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025. Although trafficking for sexual exploitation is a crime, this gendered offense – as 92% of victims are women – still runs rampant in the entirety of the EU. Trafficking for sexual exploitation generates up to EUR 14 billion annually, which illustrates the widespread  economic impact that the exploitation of marginalised women’s bodies generates.

Member States have thus far failed to accurately implement measures against sexual trafficking. TheStrategy mentions that the “complexity of the trafficking phenomenon calls for a comprehensive response”, but consequently avoids implementing practical measures regarding gender inequality. Since women, even more so transgender women, are disproportionately affected by sexual exploitation, the lack of regulation surrounding sex work and prostitution has led to  ground for human trafficking. As human trafficking for sexual exploitation is a very gendered crime that has been categorised as a form of contemporary slavery, it is crucial to keep in mind the lived experiences of victims. Sexual trafficking not only deprives them of their human rights, but also shows the clear gender divide in our society. 

Main Actors

Frontex is the agency dedicated to facilitating free movement by safekeeping the borders and coasts of Member States. In recent years, Frontex has also put a focus on human trafficking and identified almost 200 victims last year, which is a fraction of the number of victims.Furthermore, Eurojust plays an important role in the facilitation and drafting of EU legal instruments and coordinates investigations and prosecutions between multiple countries. The key difference between Eurojust and Frontex is the focus towards and requirement of multiple Member States’ involvement, as Eurojust plays a co-operative and integrating role between the legal instruments and authorities between nations.
Both agencies work together (with several other actors) to introduce new and integrated cooperative approaches to maintaining EU security in policy-cycles of four years. The current cycle has ten focus areas, one of which is human trafficking. 

Member States have autonomy over national security  and outside most of the EU’s legislative power. These European organs mostly facilitate cooperation between entities or offer guidance to national authorities. Most identified traffickers are prosecuted in the country where they committed the crime. As human trafficking often ocurrs transnationally, the process of extradition is handled to ensure that the prosecution can take place. With the use of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the identified criminals can be caught and extradited across the EU with no political involvement. Any national authority of a Member State can issue an EAW to another with minimal bureaucracy. Eurojust plays a prominent role in the implementation of EAWs through consultation and non-binding advice.

The EU Civil Society Platform against Trafficking in Human Beings is another scheme to combat human trafficking, which was set up as a response to the 2012-2016 Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking. The Platform discusses policy making initiatives, research and education programmes, the monitoring of the implementation of the Anti-Trafficking Directive 2011, and information campaigns. 

The Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) monitors the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings and regularly publishes rapports on the state of human trafficking in individual Member States.

Podcast!

Dear delegates of FEMM, 

First of all, a big welcome from your chairs Nina and Raphael, and your media team member Laurelu! We are very excited to guide you during the session, and hopefully make it as much of a unique and learning experience as it will be for us! 

Hopefully, the Topic Overview (TO) has all received you well, together with our podcast Let’s Talk About Human Trafficking. Like the TO, the podcast will mainly be about the following topic:
The silk road of inhumane transport: Although 72% of human trafficking victims in the EU were women and 60% suffered from sexual exploitation, the new EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings falls short of specific measures to protect women. Considering the variability of measures by Member States, what steps should the EU take to prevent women from trafficking for sexual exploitation?

The purpose of the podcast is to already get to know your chairpersons a little better, but also to always have a helpline when reading the TO. Nina and Raphael will be explaining the topic in a more daily, less formal language, so that you can always listen to the podcast when you do not understand something. In this way, we hope to make you a bit more comfortable with both your chairs and your topic. 
We hope that you have fun with the TO and the podcast! Goodluck!
Nina, Raphael and Laurelu

Past: Actions Taken

• Anti-Trafficking Directive 2011. The Anti-trafficking Directive is an amendment of Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, implemented by the European Parliament. It is supposed to take a victim-centred approach with a clear gender perspective. Although looking at human trafficking through the lens of gender equality is mentioned multiple times, this is not adequately implemented in the legislation proposed. There is a concrete focus on the protection of child victims of trafficking, as almost a quarter of trafficking victims are minors.

• Report on the follow-up to the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of trafficking in human beings and identifying further concrete actions 2017. This report is a reaction on the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016. Although the report clearly mentions the lack of gender-specific measures in the old Strategy, this fails to be implemented in the latest version.

• EU Strategy to Tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025. The Strategy to Tackle Organised Crime has been presented by the European Commission, in order to more accurately fight organised crime through increased law enforcement and digital measures. This Strategy is closely connected to the EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking. As the Strategy has just been implemented, not a lot of criticism has been voiced yet and it is yet to be seen whether it is effective. 

• EU Strategy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings 2021-2025. Most of the key actions mentioned in the new Strategy, adopted by the European Commission, are a continuation of the 2011 Anti-trafficking Directive. Even though the Strategy itself mentions multiple times the inadequacy of the Directive and even mentions that ‘the decade old instrument may not be fit for purpose any longer’, almost the entire Strategy is based on the implementation of that very Directive. Through this, the Strategy lacks a gendered lens as well. The Strategy failed to implement practical measures and thus did not fulfill its aim of adequately combatting human trafficking. 

Present: Existing Issues

A gendered inequality

While gender inequality in sexual trafficking is mentioned in the Strategy, little to no concrete solutions are given to combat this. One of the few mentioned approaches surrounds itself on “gender-sensitive” and “child’s rights” based training, which remains vague and poses the question what gender-sensitive training specifically entails and whether this is compatible with LGBT+ victims. The question also remains if all Member States will adopt specific anti-trafficking measures for LGBT+ individuals, specifically transgender women, as homo- and transphobic policies have been implemented in Poland and Hungary, subsequently two countries which rank in the second tier and share one of the highest human trafficking rates in Europe.  Additionally, the implementation of same-sex shelters is described, which is incompatible with a more LGBT+ friendly approach, questioning the Commission’s shift on the target groups.

While human trafficking covers many industries, over 40 per cent of all registered trafficking victims are women subjected to sexual exploitation. Despite this, no separate strategy or framework exists to support them. The Commission seeks to facilitate ‘victim empowerment programmes’ specifically for women, yet no explicit measures are promised to prevent trafficking for sexual exploitation. In the Strategy, no mention is given to effects of legal prostitution and regulation. Statistical analysis concluded that legalising prostitution has lead to an increase in human trafficking. However, the working conditions of those (legally) employed has significantly improved, even when the implementation has been criticised for inadequate policies by relevant actors and stakeholders.

Inadequacies in policies

Many discrepancies exist between Member States in the amount of victims and the level of government action. The US Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons defines three categories of anti-trafficking sufficiency among Member States. Several countries such as Denmark and Ukraine are put in tier two, which refers to failing government policies to combat human trafficking or simply a lack of initiative.
However, tier one countries are not immune to human trafficking either, as the Netherlands remains one of the most prominent places of trafficking in the EU. The current Strategy expresses these discrepancies and increasing number of victims, yet most of its proposed action remains abstract and non-innovative, thus imposing a culture of stagnation.

To unite as one

A significant number of victims are trafficked between Member States, making many cases a transnational ordeal. However, clear discrepancies in victim identification and treatment are shown which increases re-trafficking. Even when victims and their traffickers are identified, the prosecution efforts remain fruitless as many cases are suspendedor seen asminor offences. Recent developments in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) and Frontex-led missions have proven useful, yet the amount of caught perpetrators and identified victims remains minimal. As human trafficking is a crime which knows no boundaries and is scattered across Europe, with over  200.000 victims, an EU-led and centred approach is key to end this once and for all.  

Future: Challenges Ahead

As security and specifically national security is not an EU competence, the EU cannot strictly legislate on the topic of human trafficking. How can the EU balance the importance of women’s safety, while still respecting the sovereignty of the Member States? Moreover, the reality is that trafficking for sexual exploitation is an inhumane crime that cannot just be combatted through measures that only try to solve, but not prevent. In order to effectively prevent trafficking, a reduction or a regulation of the demand for trafficked services, like sex work, is needed. With regard to the possible positive or negative effects of legalisation, how can the EU best tackle the growing demand? Lastly, as this type of contemporary slavery is disproportionately gendered, what kind of actions can the EU take to protect women from trafficking for sexual exploitation?

Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Turning waste into opportunity: The EU is adopting measures to accelerate the transition to a circular economy whilst each EU citizen produces nearly half a tonne of municipal waste in a single year. In light of the Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) of the European Commission, how should the EU further support Member States in their transition to a circular economy?

Daryna Hoch (Chairperson, UA)

Introduction 

2,5 billions tons of waste that is produced each year by the Member States not only harms the environment, but also threatens EU citizens’ well-being. Only 11.2% of materials in the EU are used in a circular way. This large amount of waste is a result of a currently existing“take-make-use-dispose” linear structure of production and consumption; this leads to businesses and producers not having enough incentives to create more sustainable products. 

30 years after the first mention of the term, “circular economy” finally started gaining traction in the EU in 2015. Circular economy is a concept of resource management that is now a part of legislation of the EU and is recognised in the scientific literature as one of the key drivers for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. The main goal of the circular economy is to establish a “closed-loop system”which will limit the resources used for production and reduce waste, pollution, and carbon emissions.Transition to a circular economy must become a priority for governments and other relevant parties to preserve the environment and maintain economic development.

Main Actors

There are several actors that play a vital role in the transition to the circular economy model:

The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Environment is responsible for implementing environmental policy in the European Union. This is a governmental body that has the most impact over which EU policies will be implemented in the field of circular economy. For example, as part of the Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP), after elaborating a new legislation on single-use plastic products in the EU, the Directorate-General was able to pass the legislation by the EU governmental bodies in July 2019, which entered into force in July 2021.

Another important actor is the UN EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP), an intergovernmental platform created to combat the most drastic environmental issues and implement other policies regarding the environment on a global scale. Annual Policy Dialogue on Circular Economy between European Commision and UNEP is held between the respective representatives to boost the transition to the circular economy. The European Commission works with UNEP to develop new approaches in waste management, expand the lifetime of a product and materials, and endorse on the market eco-friendly products.

National governments are the most important actors, as they set agendas for legislation, elaborate long-term plans and make relevant decisions, therefore directly influencing the transition. Some Member States created their own strategies in support of the CEAP. However, some other Member States, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Slovakia, failed to comply with the existing legislation on waste, which is a crucial part of a transition to the circular economy, therefore being taken legal steps against by the EU governing bodies.

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is another institution that contributes to the circular economy transition by providing financing, advisory support and knowledge sharing. The EIB provides finance to circular economy projects and promoters, even to those with a higher risk profile in order to stimulate the transition to the circular economy.

Businesses, such as large companies and manufacturing plants which are part of the production circle, also play an important role in the transition to the circular economy. The challenges that the business faces while transitioning to the circular economy model, mainly include high upfront cost for industry and renewal of a new resource efficient machinery, risks and technological difficulties.

Past: Actions Taken

• European Green Deal as a set of political initiatives was proposed by the European Commission with the aim to turn the European continent into climate neutral until 2050. The main targets of the European Green Deal are to reduce pressure on natural resources, elevate the level of well-being of citizens, protect biological diversity and make the economy eco-friendly, which includes transition to the circular economy.
• The new action called “Circular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) 2.0” was adopted in March 2020 by the European Commision, as part of the European Green Deal, after achieving all of the 54 actions of the previous CEAP. The new Plan has new objectives such as reduction of waste, better managing of resource-based industries, implementing and incentivizing zero-carbon policies and creation of standardised policies of sustainable products in the European region. The Plan introduces the circular economy stages for the entire cycle of production: from creation and production to consumption, repairment, secondary usage, recycling and reuse.
• Waste Framework Directive and Landfill Directive. These are two important legislations adopted by the EU, which are crucial to the transition to the circular economy. The first one establishes the principles of waste management and waste hierarchy, while the second one introduces basic requirements of landfilling and waste treatment. Non-compliance with these two legislations led to the EU taking legal action against five Member States.
• Policy Dialogue on Circular Economy is an initiative that promotes EU and UN cooperation in the field of circular economy. Both parties join forces to spread the circular economy around the world, including efforts to drive political momentum in global fora such as the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in July 2021.
• Annual Circular Economy Stakeholder Conference is an annual event organised by the European Commission, during which business representatives, NGOs, scientists, public authorities, civil society organisations gather. The Conference serves as a knowledge sharing platform, empowers policy dialogue, provides workshops on the circular economy.
• CEC4Europe is a non-governmental organisation consisting of scientists and researchers from the field of waste management and landfilling. The NGO conducts the annual Symposium “Science and Research for Circular Economy”, where innovative research topics and new scientifically based solutions in circular economy cases are presented.
• City Loops initiative is a plan that promotes a circular economy in a holistic way, while involving all the actors – citizens, entrepreneurs, scientific community. The project, funded by the EU, focuses on seven European cities that transition their economies to circular and is serving as an example for the future.

Present: Existing Issues

One of the major issues arising from the transition is that some Member States cannot fully afford all the costs regarding implementation of the circular economy principles or do not harmonise their legislation with the EU’s. This issue also arises from the lack of technical knowledge on how to incorporate a circular economy into existing economic models.

Many initiatives of the European Commission are causing controversy among stakeholders. Representatives of organisations involved in sustainable resource management are disappointed that the CEAP does not provide further efforts to dispose of solid waste from landfills. Even taking into account the progress regarding the waste processing, approximately 175 million tons of waste are still landfilled in Europe each year. This leads to more than 140 million tons of CO2 emissions.

The European Chemical Industry Council emphasises the creation of a single European waste market that would cease the export of waste outside of Europe, promote innovative technologies and provide better access to public and private funding for the construction of new recycling facilities. Another problem lies in waste management. EU waste legislation needs to be revised to harmonise EU legislation on waste management and common practises among all Member States. 

Entrepreneurs and business owners also emphasise challenges such as high cost for removal and product innovation, risks regarding technology and operations, which remain high till final project implementation, risks on the market due to the uncertainty of customer behaviour and acceptance of the final product, and uncertainty related to the residual value of new products. 

In addition, an important issue that needs to be tackled is lack of knowledge of the importance of re-usage and about the circular economy approach and its benefits as a whole by Member States and their citizens. 

Future: Challenges Ahead

While countries such as Ireland are implementing their own national strategies, some Member States are still hesitant to undertake relevant measures and are pressured by their own NGOs to take the transition more seriously, only after which the government starts to act. So, how can the EU incentivize Member States and assist them, while trying to reach the Green Deal goals?

Policies, such as introducing digital product passport, still need to undergo a lot of consideration and reach a consensus in the European institutions in order to be implemented. In addition, the question of how new business models should be implemented and incentivized arises as well, while changing consumerism behaviours of the society.

Even though 95% of European business leaders express the notion that circular economy is a strategic choice, the transition itself still poses a lot of unanswered questions, and some entrepreneurs even consider their businesses to be pressured to comply with the regulations to continue functioning as usual. 

Circular economy in its core is an opportunity for economic growth, environmental protection and even more jobs created. But to get all of the stakeholders to work towards the same goal, while facing immense challenges as of the urge to change customer behaviour, high technological risks and upfront costs, is not an easy task, which needs to be completed, if we want to preserve our planet. 

Committee on Human Rights

Flying under the radar: The use of armed drones for targeted killings, especially outside formal war zones, remains contentious while the EU has an opportunity to play an important role in setting international standards on the use of armed drones. How can the EU address the ongoing concerns over armed drones, particularly regarding the lack of transparency, accountability and potential human rights violations?

Ema Myftiu (Chairperson, FI)

Introduction 

Since the extrajudicial killings in Afghanistan in 2001, the use of armed drones has raised controversies over the lawfulness of its employment and the human rights implications that follow. With Member States actively purchasing Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), the EU is faced with the challenge of setting international standards and addressing concerns while maintaining democratic values.

Despite armed drones becoming more and more prevalent, there is still a lack of legislation on a European level that results in legal vagueness when considering the deployment of UCAVs. Drone strikes often operate on the edge of international law with lack of clarity over the applicability of international legal frameworks and principles. Moreover, targeted killings and other lethal military operations conducted via UCAVs have proven to cause enormous humanitarian and environmental impact. 

As the EU moves towards modern and revolutionised defence systems, it is of great importance to acknowledge the human rights implications that come with UCAVs as well as the role transparency and accountability play in maintaining the rule of law.

Image 1: Eurodrone.

Main Actors

The competence in Justice and Fundamental Rights, as well as Security and Defence, is shared between the EU and Member States. The European Commission is responsible for the adoption of resolutions that directly suggest, recommend, or urge the implementation of common security and defence frameworks in addition to human rights policies. Member States primarily approach human rights and security and defence as national-level matters while respecting the power of unanimously-agreed European policies such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy.

The incorporation of said policies is achieved under the supervision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). Together with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the HR/VP assists Member States in the full implementation of the CFSP and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.

On an international scale, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) overlooks rising human rights discrepancies, including those deriving from armed conflict, and aims to address them every year. Meanwhile, issues falling under the security and defence umbrella are monitored by the United Nations Security Council who is responsible for the maintenance of peace through settlements between members.

The European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) is a civil society network that brings together actors working to promote the rule of law, the prevention of armed conflict, and the protection of human rights. Additionally, the European Centre of Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) is an independent legal and educational organisation that aims to counter injustice and human rights violations through legal interventions. Among non-governmental organisations that work to safeguard the rule of law and human rights, it is worth mentioning The Civil Liberties Union for Europe; a network made of experts that work in close cooperation with countries across Europe to assure open discussions and advocacy on Justice and Fundamental Rights.

Podcast!

Past Actions Taken

• One of the key panel discussions of UNHRC held on September 22, 2014, included various arguments and extended discussions over the use of UCAVs under International Humanitarian Law. In the panel, several Member States were asked to hold their stance on the legal provisions and applicability of armed drones.
• Europe’s engagement with the topic of armed drones began in 2012, with several Members of the European Parliament bringing forward a declaration that voiced their concerns over the targeted killings by UCAVs. In 2014, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the use of armed drones that condemned the unlawful use of UCAVs and urged stakeholders to take action in drafting a common EU policy.
• A study released by the European Parliament’s Directorate-General on External Policies in 2013 highlighted the human rights implications of the usage of armed drones in warfare, where policy recommendations were included.
• Currently, there are several projects on military drones operating under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established by the Council in December 2017. EURODRONE is one of the large-scale projects dedicated to the development of MALE RPAS (armed drone prototype). Additionally, armed drones are to be part of the Future Combat Air System, a new fighter jet platform, under the development of Spain, France and Germany.
• Member States have had different approaches to drone warfare. The official position of the German government on armed drones in 2018 condemned extrajudicial killings and advocated for the inclusion of armed unmanned vehicles into international disarmament and arms control regimes. The Netherlands, on the other hand, during the UNHRC 2014 panel discussion argued that transparency plays a crucial role in enhancing and assessing the rule of law.

Present: Existing Issues

Humanitarian Impact of Drone Warfare

As a means of revolutionising warfare, the use of UCAVs is thought to reduce the potential risks military tropes face by ceasing human contact in warzones. The ability to have easier access and control while maintaining precision in strikes is expected to lower the threshold in lethal operations engagement. However, despite its advantages, the employment of armed drones raises many questions regarding the humanitarian impact and long-term effects on civilians. Studies show that armed drones expose individuals to physical injuries and permanent mental trauma. In addition to the psychological impact drone strikes have imposed upon the populations of Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, the increased number of civilian casualties furthers the impact of armed drones in the humanitarian spectrum. Moreover, the aftermath of armed conflict inflicted by UCAVs oftentimes results in environmental harm that poses risks to the health of humans and ecosystems.

Legal Principles

The deployment of targeted killings and other military operations in international territory is regulated by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). However, legal concerns have been depicted when identifying the applicable legal framework in instances of armed drone usage. The existent ties between both frameworks create loopholes and inconsistencies that can serve as legal obstacles for national security. While IHL mentions through the principle of distinctions and proportionality that engagement must be made solely with military targets within armed conflict territory with low expected collateral damage, under IHRL, targeted killings are possible only in limited instances and must abide by the principles of necessity, proportionality and precaution. Bearing in mind the previous use of UCAVs to carry out operations on foreign territory, outside of declared war zones and without the permission of the affected countries, there is a need for clarity and information that will aid in determining the legal provisions of armed drone usage.

Adherence to the Rule of Law (Transparency, Accountability and Oversight)

With armed drone technology evolving and Member States increasingly adding UCAVs to their arsenals, controversies have been raised over their usage, especially with the US example blurring the lines between legal justification and accountability. The lack of transparency makes it hard to affirm accountability in instances of legal misconduct. Obtaining information from governments on military operations is difficult when considering national security interests. Checking legalities and operation procedures before proceeding with strikes and holding Member States accountable becomes unfavourable. Subsequently, the controversies implicated by the lack of information question the adherence to the rule of law and democratic values of the EU.

EU’s Disunited Stance

Despite many EU initiatives to address the issue of the unauthorised use of UCAVs by establishing a common policy with thorough criteria, specifically focusing on targeted killings, a Common Position is yet to be established. As a result, the concern over the lack of legislation on armed drones and the covert enablement of extrajudicial killings remains a challenge. With international law often leaving room for interpretation, the lack of a binding European framework makes Member States vulnerable to uncertainty and conflicts with third countries over the interpretation of international agreements. Moreover, the assistance of several Member States in US armed drone missions has been viewed as undermining EU human rights values. By international law, Member States aiding the US drone programme can also be considered responsible for assisting, or being complicit in, a violation of human rights or humanitarian law.

Future: Challenges Ahead

As armed drones might be closer to becoming standard equipment for most militaries, it is crucial to analyse the discrepancies and implications that come with their usage such as the humanitarian impact and human rights violations.

While there exists no current Common Position on the employment of UCAVs, international and European efforts are continuous. As we think of the future of armed drones, it would be important to ask what the first step of the EU should be to directly face the growing concerns about extrajudicial killings?

While considering the advantages and disadvantages of UCAVs, how can humanitarian implications be addressed by stakeholders? The EU’s intentions on armed drones are also important to understand how transparency, accountability and oversight can be regarded.

Taking a look at a report published by the think tank ‘RAND corporation’ on the rules for targeted killing by drones and the utilisation of armed drones by third countries, what best practises should the EU examine when drafting its own drone policies?

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Hide-and-seek along Europe’s borders: As migrants keep fleeing inhumane situations to seek refuge in the EU, borders crossing increased by 70% in 2021. In light of the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, how can the EU provide better migration policies by effective solidarity and deepening international partnerships while keeping in mind the concerns of its Member States?

Micaela Lai (Chairperson, IT)

Introduction 

On the 23^rd of September 2020, the European Commission presented a new Pact on Migration and Asylum whose aim is to improve migration policies to allow people to be protected and safe during migrations across European countries. This new Pact was meant to be a solution to the migration problem that has concerned Europe for many years now; however, the reality is that in 2021, more than 130 000 people, coming mostly from the Middle East and the African continent, walked for years to reach European countries where they only found rejection and torture.

Despite the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020, which has reduced the flow of people across the external borders, there are still many negative aspects to this migration phenomenon: overcrowded reception facilities at the EU’s external borders, illegal border practises that violate fundamental rights, and persistent backlogs in processing applications for international protection are just a few examples that illustrate the severity of the situation.

Migration is a complex issue with many facets that have to be considered together to gain a broader picture of the matter and understand its significance. It is important to keep in mind that among those migrants, there are also children and teenagers who have often fled wars, violence, and strained living conditions in search of a better life. 

Main Actors

Several actors play a fundamental role in this matter. 

The first ones are the Member States of the EU, although not all of them perform their responsibilities and duties equally: they are expected to take care of receiving migrants and guaranteeing them security and reception, respect the new Pact, and, above all, take into account the fundamental rights declared in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 

Secondly, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Agency: its aim is to work together with the Member States to ensure safe external borders (both sea and land), controls, and security around Europe.

The European Commission proposes legislation such as the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, and overlooks its implementation. Together with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it oversees the application of EU law across the Union and ensures the compliance of Member States.

The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) develops and organises training programmes for police services and other law enforcement officials in the EU. CEPOL works closely together with Eurojust, an agency that works to support judicial coordination and cooperation between national authorities in combatting terrorism and serious organised crime affecting more than one EU country. The two agencies are extremely functional in limiting, if not permanently eliminating, the ill-treatment that migrants suffer on a daily basis when they arrive at European borders.

Europol supports EU law enforcement agencies in fighting large-scale criminal activities such as terrorism, fraud, and drug trafficking. Europol also plays a vital role in border control.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) maintains international peace and security along the external borders and in destination countries, works to develop friendly relationships between European and foreign nations, and promotes better living and travelling standards for asylum seekers.

Past Actions Taken

• 1951: UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: it provided lasting contributions to the international legal system on refugee rights, including a single universal definition of the term “refugee” as well as the core principles of non-discrimination and non-penalization.
• 1999: establishment of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS): a legal and policy framework created to ensure that those seeking international protection in the EU face harmonised and uniform requirements. CEAS emphasises a shared responsibility to handle international protection applicants with dignity, ensuring equal treatment and following similar procedures for evaluating applications.
• 2016: Revision of the Dublin III Regulation: a reform of the Dublin Convention established in 1990 that determines the country responsible for processing each asylum claim. In 2017, the Regulation developed further, touching upon themes of incentivisation of asylum applicants to avoid absconding, relocations, and migrant child custody.
• 2016: Reform of the Common European Asylum System: provides an incentive for asylum seekers to apply for asylum in Member States where asylum is most likely to be granted. To ensure its success, the Reform specifically focused on consistent rules to grant refugee status across all Member States, common standards on reception conditions and partnerships and cooperation with non-EU countries.
• 2020: the new Pact on Migration and Asylum can be seen as an expansion of the previous Reform of the CEAS: its aim is to establish procedures that are more efficient and effective throughout the asylum and migration system, with a special focus on rebuilding trust between Member States and repairing confidence in the capacity of the EU to manage migration.

Present: Existing Issues

Europe has been dealing with the most serious migration problem since World War II in recent years. In 2015, there were 1.25 million first-time asylum seekers in the EU: by 2019, that number had reduced to 612 700. The total number of irregular border crossings into the EU fell to 141 700 in 2019, the lowest number in six years and 92% lower than the peak of the migrant crisis in 2015. This extraordinary influx of asylum seekers and irregular migrants into the EU necessitated more border security measures and reforms, as well as a more equitable sharing of responsibility and solidarity among EU countries. This is the reason why the CEAS was reformed in 2016 and why the new Pact on Migration and Asylum was created. However, the COVID-19 pandemic only exacerbated the problem, diminishing the impact of the several Reforms implemented in the years beforehand.

The most pressing issues are mainly social: firstly, the brutal treatment that migrants face when they reach the European borders, together with the pushbacks, result in stalemate situations where the migrants are caught between borders. Secondly, already underfunded asylum shelters are often overcrowded, worsening the living conditions.

One of the worst examples of this mistreatment is the migrant camp in Moria, on the Greek island of Lesbos. The migrants face threats of murder and everpresent children and women abuse. Moreover, although Moria camp has the capacity to accommodate around 3000 people, it is severely overcrowded, which results in crammed and unhygienic living conditions, without the possibility of following COVID-19 pandemic regulation.

On September 8, 2020, a fire broke out in Moria, destroying almost the entire refugee camp. It is unclear how exactly the fire started, but the Greek migration minister believed it was the migrants’ fault as many were against the imposed quarantine. Apart from that, the government was tasked with finding new accommodation for more than 12 000 people who were temporarily housed in tents by the sea, but even today, after more than a year, have not been relocated.

Another issue are the tensions between Greece and Turkey: since Greece is one of the EU’s top entry points for migrants and Turkey is the most transitory country for people coming from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, the two governments signed an agreement in 2016 which required asylum seekers who travelled by sea from the Turkish coast to stay on the Turkish islands while their claims were reviewed. However, in 2020, Turkey declared to be no longer available to hold refugees and prompted hundreds of them to walk towards the Greek border, causing the previously achieved equilibrium to collapse.

The problems do not lie only at the external borders of the Union: Hungary has been highly criticised for its aggressive policies for dealing with migrants, such as the use of attack dogs, strip searches in freezing temperatures, or detaining migrants in shipping containers until their cases are heard. This is because Hungary is refusing to participate in the binding EU agreement that requires Member States to relocate asylum seekers equitably across the European Union, since they are considered “potential terrorists” and “intruders”. This is a clear demonstration that the solutions exist but they are not respected by every European country, lacking cooperation and, above all, humanity.

Future: Challenges Ahead

Migration and integration will be a critical challenge for Europe as a whole in the coming years. The potential scenarios are numerous. As seen from the past CEAS interventions and the current Pact on Migration and Asylum, success is not guaranteed. However, there is hope for improvement: the Pact has only been in force for a relatively short period of time, and destabilising events such as the Covid-19 pandemic or the conflict in Afghanistan have compromised the stability of the world.

What the EU is willing to achieve is a real and strong European border and coast guard. The future goals of the EU are the cooperation of Member States and EU agencies, more border controls around Europe, creation of a worldwide consciousness about the dynamics and consequences of migration and asylum, and overall, reaching the European sense of community and solidarity that should be mastered in this field as well. Through these goals, the EU aims to ensure safety and security for all migrants who face daily hardships during their journeys and undermine the strength of the EU’s values: human dignity, freedom and equality.

To understand more about this truly important topic, have a further reading at this very detailed document that explains the current situation along the main migration routes, analysing country by country and giving a wider view of the issue.

Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Law is in the air: Justice systems of certain Member States face recent reforms that threaten fundamental European values such as democracy and the rule of law, leading to a deterioration in the relationship between the EU and those Member States. How should the EU tackle this crisis while protecting the values and rights of the EU and the citizens in relevant Member States?

Stella Imo (Chairperson, DE)

Introduction 

The EU was built on principles and common values every Member State is strongly bound to. One of those principles is the rule of law, based on Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Respecting the European rule of law means respecting democracy and should be the central value in every Member State. Currently, the rule of law in Europe is under threat. Autocratically-minded parties in Poland and Hungary have actively attacked the independence of the judiciary. They fail to comply with EU fundamental legal principles and ignore judgments of the European Court of Justice and thus neglect the principles and common values the EU is built upon.

Main Actors

Member States of the EU have their own judiciary systems. However, Member States, when exercising the competence to organise the judiciary in their country, are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law. This has not happened in Poland and Hungary when these countries have reformed their judiciary system. Poland’s highest court decided that some parts of the European law are even in direct conflict with the constitution of the country.

European Court of Justice (CJEU): the highest court of the European Union in matters of European Union law. Its role is to interpret EU law and ensure its correct implementation within the Member States. By entering the EU the Member States accepted the primacy of EU law and thus the final jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice — its judgments have to be respected by all. If a Member States violates European law, a case can be brought before the CJEU. If a country does not act in compliance with the order, the Court is also allowed to punish the country with fines. 

European Commission: ensures the respect of EU law and is responsible together with the European Council, the Member States and the Council of the European Union, for guaranteeing the fundamental values of the Union such as the rule of law. 

Podcast!

A podcast by Sinéad O’Reilly (Media Team Member), Stella Imo (Chairperson) and MEP Damian Boeselager.

Past: Actions Taken

• The Rule of Law Framework: in 2014, the European Commission adopted this framework for addressing systemic threats to the rule of law. The European Commission first establishes a dialogue with the country concerned. It assesses the situation, proposes its opinion about it and recommends to the Member States the further steps to take. 

• The Article 7 procedure: If there is no solution found within the rule of law framework, the European Commission can employ this mechanism as the last legal possibility to solve the crisis. It includes two different options: preventive measures such as issuing recommendations and giving a formal warning and sanctions. The last and most drastic measure is the suspension of the Member State’s voting rights in the Council. This “nuclear option” has never been used before. 

• Infringements: the Commission is allowed to take an infringement procedure against a Member State that does not implement EU law correctly. This procedure consists of different steps, the last one is referring the matter to the CJEU. The CJEU can then order the accused Member States to reverse any actions which are not in line with the contractual obligations each Member State has. If the country still does not solve the issue, the Commission can propose financial penalties in front of the Court. 

• EU Justice Scoreboard: compares national justice systems of the Member States by providing objective and reliable data on the independence, quality and efficiency of the justice systems. See the EU Justice Scoreboard of 2021. 

• ‘Rule-of-law’ mechanism: This mechanism was created by the EU in response to cases in which Member States break the rule-of-law. The new legal measure is supposed to enable the European Commission to cut EU funds for such countries. It came into force at the beginning of 2020 but currently needs to be reviewed by the CJEU due to a request from Hungary and Poland about its legality.

• Withholding EU recovery money: In order to penalise Hungary and Poland, the Commission withholds the money from the EU recovery fund for the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Present: Existing Issues

The Principle of Subsidiarity within the EU: EU competences are employed under the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This means that the Union is only allowed to act within the scope of its powers. For the national structures of the constitutions, the EU has no power to intervene. Especially Poland relies on this principle of the EU: when the CJEU published an order for Poland to suspend a controversial disciplinary mechanism for judges, Poland argued that the EU does not have the power to regulate the justice system in a Member State, and did not comply with this order. Poland perceived this as undermining state sovereignty and overriding the country’s constitution. The country is also stating that the EU would undermine its treaties by going beyond its competences. As a consequence, the Court penalised Poland with a fine of one million euros per day for not following the previous order. But Poland refrains from accepting any sanctions as in their eyes, the CJEU does not even have the authority to do so.

Underlying problems in Poland and Hungary: It has been claimed that Poland and Hungary do not have an independent justice system anymore. Many have argued that in both countries, the governments were able to get the whole justice system under their control. In such situations, where a country reforms its constitution, it can come into conflict with European law. Here, the European Commission is at its limit when it comes to sanctions. Although Poland and Hungary have faced repercussions, this has resulted in little to no change. As a result, five European Parliament groups called on the President of the Commission in a joint letter to adopt even stronger measures. Different EU lawmakers, activists and the opposition in Budapest and Warsaw have blamed the Commission for not employing the ‘Rule of law’ mechanism. The European Parliament even submitted a lawsuit against the Commission. After the Commission triggered this mechanism in December 2017 for the first time, Poland and Hungary have questioned the legality of it at the CJEU which is now reviewing the process. The Commission is able to use the mechanism while the CJEU  makes a decision, but refrains from doing so as it has been asked so by the general secretariat of the Council. Triggering of the mechanism would result in an even bigger cut of the funds the countries receive from the EU. With Poland being the biggest recipient of the EU budget, followed by Hungary, this could have a big impact on the countries. 

The limits of legal measures: At the end of the procedure of the Article 7 TEU, the final and most drastic option is to sanction a country for violating EU law: for this, an unanimous decision is needed in the European Council. With Poland and Hungary both being the accused and having a relatively strong relationship, they would be able to save each other from the sanctions. 

Polexit: the whole conflict especially with Poland raised fears of a “Polexit” — a Polish EU exit. Although the government of Poland has neglected this option, the decision of the Polish constitutional government that elements of the EU law are not compatible with the Polish constitution touches the core idea of the EU common law. For some, due to that reason, the Polexit has already started. But it is not seen as Poland quitting the EU but rather as a downgrading of Poland to not being a full Member State anymore. A complete exit would not be a popular decision, as 87% of the Polish citizens want their country to remain in the EU.

Future: Challenges Ahead

Both Hungary and Poland have reformed their justice systems making the judiciary more independent. By doing so they both have disrespected the European rule of law and thus have violated a basic principle the EU is founded on. This has been strongly condemned by the institutions of the EU and other Member States. The European Commission has reacted with several measures, trying to make Poland and Hungary revoke the critical reforms. Yet, this was not successful, especially Poland keeps insisting on its national freedom to change their constitution. By not recognizing any of the sanctions and judgements of the CJEU the country confronts the Commission with unprecedented issues.

As existing measures do not stop Poland and Hungary from violating EU law, which more drastic measures should the EU develop? How could the European Commission introduce such measures in the form of laws and mechanisms taking into account that Poland and Hungary would veto them? 

Should the other Member States take action and bring cases against Poland to the CJEU through their national courts? As an example the Czech Republic took Poland before the CJEU over environmental damage and succeeded with Poland having to pay a high fine. Or would this rather lead to more animosity between the Member States? 

How can the EU work to prevent a recurral of the situation in Hungary and Poland? Where should the EU draw the line between actions of countries it tolerates and actions it takes measures against?

What is the role of public opinion in Poland and Hungary? Is the public opinion consulted enough in decision making?